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ABSTRACT
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) pursuit for 
a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) first began 
during the Cold War, at a time of intense superpower rivalry in 
Southeast Asia. ASEAN reaffirmed the importance of this principle 
in 2020, amid growing concerns of instability in the Asia-Pacific 
region as a result of increasing tensions between the United 
States (US) and China. Through an examination of the ZOPFAN 
principle, this paper seeks to develop a greater understanding of 
ASEAN’s ability to respond to periods of geopolitical crisis and Great 
Power rivalry. It asks whether a ZOPFAN in Southeast Asia has ever 
been successfully realised, and what is the likelihood of one being 
achieved in the future. As analysis of recent security challenges will 
show, ZOPFAN falls short as both a framework for regional security 
and as an expression of regional autonomy. This raises serious 
questions about ASEAN’s coherence in the post-Cold War era, and 
its ability to uphold regional order in light of renewed Great Power 
security competition.
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The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regional organisation established 
during the Cold War to promote cooperation and integration amongst the states of 
Southeast Asia. Established in 1967, it celebrated its 53rd anniversary on 8 August 2020. 
The organisation marked this day by releasing a Foreign Ministers’ joint statement on the 
importance of maintaining peace and stability in Southeast Asia. Highlighting the ‘grow-
ing uncertainties resulting from the changing geo-political dynamics in the regional and 
global landscape’ the statement expressed concern over the ‘detrimental ramifications’ of 
these challenges for the region (ASEAN 2020a, 2020b). In a plea for ‘all countries to 
exercise self-restraint’, the statement reiterates ASEAN’s commitment to ‘maintaining 
Southeast Asia as a region of peace, security, neutrality and stability’ (ASEAN 2020a, 
2020b). In doing so, it reaffirms the importance of upholding ASEAN’s principles encap-
sulated within its Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) and Zone of 
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) (ASEAN 1976; ASEAN 1971 respectively). ASEAN 
first declared a ZOPFAN in Southeast Asia in 1971 at the height of the Cold War. In 
a declaration signed by ASEAN’s five founding states,1 the regional states at that time 
stressed their commitment to ‘the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial 
CONTACT Laura Southgate l.southgate@aston.ac.uk
POLITICAL SCIENCE                                         
https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2021.1967762
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/ 
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly 
cited.
integrity of all states’ and ‘the right of every state, large or small, to lead its national 
existence free from outside interference in its internal affairs’ (ASEAN 1971). To this end, 
‘the neutralisation of South East Asia’ was viewed as a ‘desirable objective’ that should be 
explored and realised (ASEAN 1971).
ASEAN’s recent reaffirmation of ZOPFAN is indicative of the increasing instability in the 
Asia-Pacific region as a result of superpower rivalry between the US and China, and 
ASEAN’s growing fears of becoming embroiled in a potential ‘new Cold War’ in Asia 
(Westad 2019). Since the end of the Cold War, the states of ASEAN have pursued largely 
positive relations with both China and the US, to their own economic and political benefit 
(Medeiros 2005, 146). Whether this status quo can be maintained in light of deteriorating 
US-China relations is less clear. As Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore warned in 
2018, tensions in the US-China relationship may create circumstances ‘where ASEAN will 
have to choose one or the other’, something which he hoped ‘does not happen soon’ 
(Muzaffar 2018). To explore these themes in more detail, this paper will examine a number 
of contemporary crises that have impacted the region as a result of deteriorating US- 
China relations. Pinpointing a precise date of this downturn in relations is difficult. The 
paper uses the 2011–2012 timeframe as a starting point. This coincided with the Obama 
administration’s 2011 Asia ‘Pivot’ foreign policy strategy and the more assertive Chinese 
foreign policy following Xi Jinping’s promotion to President of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) (Godbole 2015). Acknowledging China’s renewed assertiveness, both the 
Obama and Trump administrations have sought to counter China’s growing regional 
and international ambitions through foreign policy initiatives such as the Asia ‘Pivot’ 
and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, increased patrols in the South China Sea, and 
through economic and trade competition.
The paper seeks to explore this complex relationship in more detail through examina-
tion of ASEAN’s use of the ZOPFAN principle. The paper asks whether a ZOPFAN still exists 
in Southeast Asia. In doing so it addresses two interrelated questions: has ASEAN’s pursuit 
for a ZOPFAN in Southeast Asia ever been successfully realised? And, what is the like-
lihood of one being achieved in the future? In doing so, it examines the way in which the 
changing geopolitical interests and policies of the Great Powers impact the states of 
Southeast Asia, and how this collection of small regional states align themselves during 
periods of geopolitical crisis and heightened superpower rivalry. ASEAN’s reaffirmation of 
the ZOPFAN principle in response to deteriorating US-China relations is puzzling con-
sidering the Association’s limited adherence to the concept to date. Its continued usage 
has served a purpose, forming part of the Association’s strategy at hedging between the 
Great Powers. As suggested here, use of the concept in this context is increasingly 
untenable as security competition between the US and China forces ASEAN states to 
engage in more balancing behaviour. Conceptualised as both a regional security frame-
work and as an expression of regional autonomy, the paper argues that ZOPFAN has 
ultimately failed to achieve either. ASEAN’s unsuccessful attempts at a regional multi-
lateral security dialogue and its inability to prevent external interference in the region 
make the achievement of a ZOPFAN more a fantasy than a reality.
The paper will begin by examining ZOPFAN in more detail. This includes a brief back-
ground of the declaration, and an examination of the principle’s core aims. The paper will 
then consider some of the core security challenges to have impacted ASEAN-US-China 
relations since 2011. Special attention will be given to identifying how these crises have 
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undermined ASEAN’s development of a regional security framework and quest for regio-
nal autonomy. The paper will conclude with an assessment of the challenges facing 
ASEAN’s pursuit of a ZOPFAN, including the long-term impact for the region of 
entrenched US-China relations.
Unpacking the ZOPFAN principle
ZOPFAN was born out of a collective desire amongst the states of Southeast Asia for 
regional autonomy following a protracted period of external interference in the form of 
Western and Japanese colonialism and US-Soviet Great Power security competition. The 
implementation of ZOPFAN in 1971 represented a compromise amongst the ASEAN 
states. Malaysia first proposed a policy of ‘neutralisation’ in 1970. The proposal had two 
components: to seek explicit guarantees from the US, Soviet Union and China that they 
would abstain from involving the region in their security competition; and that regional 
states would pursue policies of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs and avoid 
inviting external interference into Southeast Asia (Narine 1998, 198). This proposal was 
not well-received, internationally or regionally. Rather than pursue a policy of disengage-
ment in Southeast Asia, both the US and the Soviet Union actively sought an enhanced 
presence in the region. Indonesia opposed any proposal that relied on the guarantees of 
external powers and viewed Malaysia’s proposal as a vehicle to facilitate China’s influence 
regionally (Leifer 1989, 56). For Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore, the US was a vital 
component in their own security strategies. This was something they were unwilling to 
relinquish at a time of increased instability. The result was a watered-down ZOPFAN, one 
that ‘avoided the legal rigour of the concept of neutralisation and excluded any prero-
gative role in South-East Asia for major powers’ (Leifer 1989, 7).
By 1976, ZOPFAN had largely been superseded by the Association’s Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation. ASEAN’s founding peace treaty, the TAC encapsulated a number of core 
principles that have served to guide member state behaviour. This included formalising 
a number of objectives designated under ZOPFAN, most notably ‘the right of every State 
to lead its national existence free from external interference’ (ASEAN 1976). ZOPFAN was 
also overshadowed by events in Indochina during the Cold War. The invasion of 
Cambodia by a Soviet-backed Vietnam in 1978 spread concern throughout the region. 
Fearing further Vietnamese expansion, ASEAN actively sought security guarantees from 
the US and China to prevent a Vietnamese fait accompli (Southgate 2019, 71–116). 
Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia lasted until the end of the Cold War in 1991, allowing 
ASEAN ‘to hold the convenient position that the realisation of ZOPFAN had to await the 
resolution of the Cambodia conflict’ (Acharya 2001, 56). The end of the Cold War injected 
a renewed sense of hope in ZOPFAN (Alagappa 1991, 271). The principle has since 
become an embedded part of ASEAN’s lexicon. The 2003 Bali Concord II Declaration, 
the Association’s blueprint for future integration, confirmed that political instruments 
such as ZOPFAN would ‘continue to play a pivotal role in the area of confidence building 
measures, preventive diplomacy and the approaches to conflict resolution’ (ASEAN 2003).
This brief history highlights a puzzle central to ZOPFAN. On the one hand, the principle 
has repeatedly been contravened. ASEAN states prioritised alliances with external Great 
Powers such as the United States and China as a means of achieving state and regional 
security during the Cold War. This would suggest that the ASEAN states held little faith in 
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the concept and did not regard it as a means for upholding regional security and stability. 
At the same time, ASEAN has continued to use ZOPFAN in the post-Cold War period, 
going so far as to integrate and reaffirm its core principles when it could have been 
dropped from the Association’s lexicon altogether. This suggests that ASEAN perceives 
the concept as having some utility. It also suggests that the two seemingly opposing 
positions may not be antithetical. This perspective will be explored in more detail through 
an examination of the ZOPFAN concept in both the Cold War and post-Cold War period.
ZOPFAN as a regional multilateral security framework
To conceptualise ZOPFAN, this paper adopts an approach utilised by Hanggi (1991). In this 
view, states are presented with three approaches to national security when threatened by 
external powers: security through an international alliance, security through regional 
order and cooperation, and security through non-alignment and neutrality (Hanggi 
1991, 1). ZOPFAN is an example of the latter two. It is both a ‘prescription for an ideal 
regional order’ (Hanggi 1991, 1) and a ‘profession of nonalignment as an ultimate regional 
goal’ (Simon 1982, 3). In examining the former, there is clearly general agreement within 
the ASEAN security literature that ZOPFAN represents an early attempt at a framework 
that seeks to promote regional peace and stability in Southeast Asia (Simon 1982; Leifer 
1989; Alagappa 1991; Narine 1998). However, deeper analysis shows the limited success of 
ZOPFAN as a framework for regional security. This has created a weak basis from which 
ASEAN has expanded its security architecture. Indeed, those factors which limited 
ZOPFAN’s applicability during the Cold War have persisted, undermining ASEAN’s more 
recent attempts at multilateral security. One of the major stumbling blocks for ZOPFAN 
was that as a framework for state relations it did ‘not propose any obligations’ on either 
ASEAN member states or external powers and as such lacked ‘operational relevance’ 
(Hanggi 1991, 22, 21). As such, the concept was ‘devoid of immediate utility other than to 
serve as a reference point for and symbol of intra-ASEAN solidarity’ (Leifer 1989, 7–8).
For some authors, the latter is an achievement in itself. For Ba (2009, 76), ZOPFAN 
served to ‘reaffirm common principles’ within ASEAN, acting as ‘a common commitment 
to one another’ during an uncertain period in the region’s history. Acharya (2001) adopts 
a similar approach, viewing ZOPFAN as an early example of ASEAN norm development 
designed to regulate member state behaviour and enhance regional order. However, 
evidence suggests that ZOPFAN is more an example of regional state divergence than 
commonality. ZOPFAN served to highlight the differing threat perceptions amongst the 
ASEAN states. During the Cold War period, Thailand largely viewed Vietnam as a primary 
threat following the latter’s invasion of Cambodia and Thailand’s geographic proximity to 
the threat. As a front-line state, Thailand was proactive in attempting to secure US and 
Chinese security guarantees at that time (Southgate 2019). This approach can be con-
trasted with Indonesia. Believing China responsible for supporting communist elements 
within its borders, Indonesia viewed China as a primary threat (Southgate 2019, 81). 
Vietnam was viewed more sympathetically in light of its shared history of external 
interference. Such differences in threat perception clearly undermined ZOPFAN’s utility 
as a framework for regional security during this time period.
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In the post-Cold War, these differing threat perceptions have become even more 
pronounced. This is in part due to ASEAN enlargement following the end of the Cold 
War. Between 1995 and 1999, ASEAN expanded to include Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and 
Myanmar. These states demonstrate clear differences in their approach to external 
powers. For example, Cambodia has pursued close relations with China in return for 
economic and political benefits (Ciorciari 2013). Vietnam, on the other hand, has increas-
ingly sought to strengthen relations with the US as a response to its maritime sovereignty 
dispute with China in the South China Sea (Heibert, Nguyen, and Poling 2014). These 
differing perceptions of threat and opportunity underpin a further flaw with ZOPFAN, 
which is its uneven application vis-a-vis the external powers. Whilst the proposal osten-
sibly sought to limit all external interference in Southeast Asia during the Cold War, 
ASEAN’s attempts to engage the US and China in a containment strategy of Vietnam 
indicate that ZOPFAN was actually directed exclusively against the Soviet Union (Simon 
1984, 530). This is a point not lost on China, which may view ASEAN’s recent reaffirmation 
of ZOPFAN as an attempt to exclude China regionally. This will be exacerbated by ASEAN’s 
post-Cold War stance towards the two great powers, comprising of a ‘generally favourable 
appraisal of the United States . . . and a more cautious attitude towards China’ (Ganesan 
2000, 258).
Such divisions and inconsistencies have compromised ASEAN’s more recent attempts 
at multilateral security cooperation. One example of this is the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF), ASEAN’s post-Cold War vehicle for multilateral security dialogue established in 
1994. Currently comprising 27 member states, including the US, China and all ASEAN 
member states, the ARF’s aim is to ‘foster constructive dialogue and consultation on 
political and security issues of common interest and concern’ (ASEAN 1994). Former 
Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas stated in 1994 that the ARF would provide an 
opportunity to realise ZOPFAN ‘in consultation with friendly countries, taking into 
account changing circumstances’ (Alatas 1994, 13). The ARF’s attempt to work with 
outside powers rather than excluding them represented a departure from the original 
ZOPFAN blueprint. For Acharya (2001, 172), this erosion of the norm of regional autonomy 
is an example of ASEAN’s prioritisation of the new norm of cooperative security. The ARF’s 
success as a vehicle for cooperative security can be debated, however. Whilst Heller (2005, 
123) claims that the ARF is a forum ‘that reflects the convergence of strategic interests of 
both the regional actors and external actors’, Narine (1997, 965) highlights that when ARF 
member state interests diverge ASEAN ‘can, at most, create only the appearance of unity’. 
Differing state interests and threat perceptions, coupled with the Association’s inclination 
to sweep more intractable issues under the rug (Khoo 2004), mean that the ARF ultimately 
has a limited utility as a framework for regional security. Rather than realise ZOPFAN, the 
ARF has distorted the principle, making its current application in the contemporary 
context unclear.
ZOPFAN as an expression of regional autonomy
ASEAN has equally struggled to achieve national security through non-alignment and 
neutrality (Hanggi 1991, 1). During the Cold War, neutrality was defined by ASEAN as the 
prohibition of foreign military bases within ASEAN states, abstention from entering into 
any military alliance or military pact, and prohibition from using, storing or testing nuclear 
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weapons within the region (Hanggi 1991, 26). Neutrality can therefore be understood as 
an attempt by the ASEAN states to insulate the region from Great Power security 
competition. For Emmers (2018), the concept of ASEAN neutrality is not static, but 
evolving. Whilst during the Cold War neutrality was evoked in an attempt to exclude 
Great Powers from the region, the concept has since been reconceptualised in an attempt 
to engage the Great Powers in a more inclusive and cooperative way (Emmers 2018, 351). 
Emmers (2018, 351) goes on to define neutrality according to ‘impartiality, to be under-
stood as not taking sides in Great Power dynamics; and autonomy, which refers to an 
attempt to limit external interference in Southeast Asia’s affairs’. Defining neutrality 
through the notion of autonomy is prevalent elsewhere in the literature. Emmers (2003, 
16) has claimed in the past that ASEAN ‘in essence . . . registered a call for regional 
autonomy’ through ZOPFAN. Similarly, Ba (1997) states that the signing of ZOPFAN in 
1971 ‘illustrates the transcendent ideal of regional autonomy’.
ASEAN’s ability to achieve neutrality in the Southeast Asian region has been compli-
cated by the differing strategic interests of the ASEAN member states. Its ability to act as 
a unitary actor during the Cold War was continuously challenged. It was most cohesive 
during the Cambodia conflict, when the threat of Vietnamese aggression and expansion 
into Southeast Asia helped promote ASEAN cooperation. However, containment of 
Vietnam was only possible in collaboration with the US and China, thus undermining 
neutrality. Also, as noted by Emmers (2018, 354), ‘the neutrality of a region is likely to 
depend on its ability to resolve or manage its own potential or actual conflicts’. This view 
of regional autonomy as a ‘regional solution to regional problems’ (Acharya 2001, 51) has 
also been undermined in Southeast Asia, both during the Cold War and in the post-Cold 
War period. The region has suffered a number of regional crises since 1991, including the 
Asian Financial Crisis, the humanitarian crisis in East Timor, the South China Sea dispute 
and the Rohingya refugee crisis, none of which have been resolved regionally. An inter-
national peacekeeping force was required to end conflict in East Timor (Cotton 2004). 
ASEAN have also abdicated any responsibility for the resolution of the Rohingya crisis, 
necessitating involvement from the United Nations. ASEAN’s inability (or unwillingness) to 
provide regional solutions to regional problems has therefore invited external interfer-
ence into the region, undermining regional autonomy in the process. Recognising the 
difficulties in upholding regional autonomy, Emmers (2018, 362) argues that ASEAN 
shifted from a position of regional autonomy towards a position of impartiality in the 
post-Cold War period. In this view ASEAN has sought to achieve impartiality by institu-
tionalising regional relations through forums such as the ARF, promoting diplomatic rules 
of engagement and remaining a central actor in the regional security architecture 
(Emmers 2018, 362–363). For Emmers (2018, 363) preservation of this impartiality is crucial 
to prevent being drawn into security competition between China and the US.
The view that ASEAN’s institutions and principles have had a positive impact on 
regional relations and state autonomy is shared by a number of ASEAN scholars. Stubbs 
(2008, 452) claims that ASEAN’s paradigm ‘presents an increasingly distinctive and influ-
ential option’ for regional and global governance. Johnston (1999) goes one step further, 
arguing that ASEAN’s institutions have provided the conditions for the socialisation of 
external actors, particularly China. This view of ASEAN achieving impartiality through 
regional multilateral initiatives and centrality has been challenged, however. ASEAN’s 
diplomatic rules of engagement are based upon the ‘ASEAN Way’, a method of managing 
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state relations through informality, consensus, and non-binding decision making. Whilst 
ASEAN hoped that its unique organisational structure would provide a non-threatening 
environment in which to engage external powers over regional challenges, the reality has 
meant that ‘the politics of the lowest common denominator has tended to prevail and 
difficult problems have been avoided rather than confronted’ (Beeson 2016, 10). This 
preference to shelve intractable disputes has benefited China, which has adopted 
ASEAN’s nonconfrontational style whilst securing its own interests in the region (Jones 
and Smith 2007, 179). As noted by Jones and Smith (2007, 179), ‘conflict avoidance plays 
into China’s hegemonic ambition of returning the region to its precolonial order’ whilst 
‘effectively exclud[ing] the United States’.
Recent events provide further evidence that ASEAN’s ability to maintain impartiality 
has been repeatedly undermined. As the case analysis will show, the South China Sea 
dispute has divided ASEAN and driven its different members deeper into the arms of the 
Great Powers. Under the presidency of Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines has been less 
vocal in pursuing its claims to sovereignty over maritime territory in favour of deepening 
engagement with China. In doing so it has unravelled the former Aquino administration’s 
balancing agenda with the United States (De Castro 2016a). Vietnam on the other hand 
has been incentivised to deepen security ties with the US. ASEAN’s struggle to maintain 
impartiality has increased commensurate with tensions in US-China relations. Whilst 
ASEAN has attempted to pursue a hedging strategy to balance relations with the great 
powers (Kuik 2016), this has had mixed success (Ciorciari 2019). As the case of the South 
China Sea shows, doubts regarding US commitment to defend Southeast Asian maritime 
security has undermined regional attempts at hedging, forcing claimant states to pursue 
alternative strategies such as balancing or accommodation towards China (Ciorciari 2019, 
526). This became more pronounced as US commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific 
region under President Donald Trump waned. ASEAN’s ‘persistent commitment to hed-
ging’ vis-à-vis the great powers in light of increased great power security competition and 
‘in face of external pressure to take sides’ appears increasingly untenable (Tan 2020, 131).
Taken together, this suggests little evidence for a ZOPFAN ever being realised in 
Southeast Asia. ASEAN state increasing recourse to balance of power politics to secure 
their own interests, as evident in the South China Sea region, supports the argument that 
ASEAN views ZOPFAN as a failed and irrelevant concept. This makes its usage as recently 
as 2020 perplexing. However, continued application of ZOPFAN makes sense when 
viewed through ASEAN’s persistent attempts at hedging since the end of the Cold War. 
Unlike balancing behaviour, where states are responding to ‘clear and present threats’ 
that states must ‘resist or accommodate’, hedging instead implies the ‘cultivation of 
protective options’, that ‘do not involve attaining a security commitment, let alone 
a security guarantee’ (Ciorciari and Haacke 2019, 369). Kuik (2016, 504) similarly defines 
hedging as ‘insurance-seeking behaviour’ that prepares a ‘fallback position’ vis-à-vis the 
competing powers. One of the three main policy elements of any hedging strategy is ‘an 
insistence on not taking sides among competing powers’ (Kuik 2016, 504). ASEAN’s 
statements reaffirming ZOPFAN can be viewed as another form of risk management 
that acts as a protective option positioning ASEAN equidistant between the Great 
Powers. As hedging makes way for balancing behaviour, utilisation of the concept 
becomes increasingly unsustainable. What is the likelihood of a ZOPFAN being achieved 
in the future? The following analysis will consider this question by examining the major 
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challenges that ASEAN has faced as a result of deteriorating US-China relations since 2011. 
These include the Obama and Trump administrations’ changing foreign policy strategies 
towards the region, the South China Sea dispute and the US-China trade war.
Testing ZOPFAN: contemporary ASEAN-US-China relations
The Obama administration’s ‘Pivot’ to Asia strategy appeared on the surface to be a good 
example of ASEAN reaping the benefits of engagement with the US without fear of 
antagonising China. In reality however, the strategy divided ASEAN and raised regional 
fears of being drawn into a US-led, Chinese encirclement strategy. First articulated by then- 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in an address in Hanoi in 2010, the strategy was formally 
outlined by President Obama in an address to the Australian Parliament on 
17 November 2011. Recognising the ‘the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region’ (White 
House 2011), Obama pledged to rebalance US priorities towards Asia by enhancing 
commitment to regional security, re-engaging with regional organisations (particularly 
ASEAN), and advancing US-Asia shared prosperity through free trade and the Trans- 
Pacific Partnership (TPP). The Obama administration’s commitment to re-engaging the 
region was met with a degree of hesitation from within ASEAN. Wary of triggering 
a negative response from China, the Indonesian foreign minister warned of the potential 
dangers of a ‘vicious cycle of tensions and mistrust’ (Bush 2012). Singapore’s foreign 
minister echoed Indonesia’s concern, stating that ASEAN wanted to avoid becoming 
‘caught between the competing interests’ of the US and China (Bush 2012). Despite 
these concerns, evidence shows a gradual increase in US engagement with ASEAN from 
2009 onwards.
This began with US accession to ASEAN’s TAC in February 2009, a ‘symbol of commit-
ment to engagement in Southeast Asia, and to the organization’s emphasis on multilateral 
processes’ (Manyin, Garcia, and Morrison 2009). The United States’ first resident ambassa-
dor to ASEAN was established in September 2010. This was accompanied by an increase in 
trade between 2012 and 2013, rising from $200 billion to $206.9 billion (Keo 2014). The US 
also engaged with a number of ASEAN states, including Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam, 
through the TPP. President Obama also held an ASEAN Summit at the Sunnylands resort 
California in 2016 which all ASEAN leaders attended. This was the first time an ASEAN 
summit was held in the US. Enhanced positive relations with the US was balanced by 
similar good relations with China. In 2010, the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (FTA) formally 
came into effect. This nearly doubled ASEAN-China trade from $192 billion in 2008 to 
$515 billion by 2018 (Biswas 2018). ASEAN member states were also founding members of 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a Chinese-led initiative established in 2016 
to counter the TPP. Since establishment, the AIIB committed approximately $670 million of 
infrastructure loans in ASEAN countries (AIIB 2019). ASEAN’s commitment to US and China 
regional initiatives, in addition to US-China commitment to ASEAN’s own multilateral 
institutions, seemingly supports the assessment by Emmers (2018) of ASEAN seeking to 
maintain a degree of neutrality in Southeast Asia in accordance with ZOPFAN’s core 
principles. In reality however, this US-China charm offensive has left ASEAN increasingly 
pulled between two opposing forces. Nowhere is this more pronounced than in the South 
China Sea, where competing sovereignty claims and increased great power rivalry have 
stoked disunity and increased external interference in the region.
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South China sea dispute: the failure of regional autonomy
One of the Obama administration pledges as part of the Asia ‘Pivot’ strategy was 
enhanced commitment to regional security. In Southeast Asia this manifested as 
support for those ASEAN states engaged in sovereignty disputes with China over 
territory in the South China Sea. There are a number of overlapping claims to 
disputed islands in the region. Most notable are the Paracel Islands, claimed by 
China, Vietnam and Taiwan, and the Spratly Islands, subject to a number of compet-
ing claims from China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. China claims 
historic rights to all maritime territory in the region, a claim that it has pursued more 
assertively over the last decade. Vietnam and the Philippines have been at the 
forefront of this dispute. Relations between China and Vietnam experienced 
a downturn in 2007, when China allegedly coerced a number of energy companies 
to abandon offshore gas development activities initiated by Vietnam (Wikileaks 2007). 
A standoff between Filipino and Chinese vessels in the Scarborough Shoal in 2012 
lasted over two months, triggering anti-Chinese demonstrations in the Philippines (De 
Castro 2016b). The Obama administration’s commitment to regional security came at 
an opportune time for these states, both of which actively sought US security 
guarantees in addition to support from regional powers such as India and Australia 
(Southgate and Khoo 2016).
In 2013, the Philippines’ Aquino government began formal dispute proceedings 
against China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) under Article 287 of the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Through UNCLOS the 
Philippines’ hoped to resolve the maritime dispute with China and address the law-
fulness of China’s actions in the region (Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs 
Manila, 2013). President Obama declared his support for the Philippines’ arbitration 
case whilst at a Press Conference in Manila in 2014 (White House 2014). He reiterated his 
support in 2015, stating concern that China ‘is not necessarily abiding by international 
norms and rules and is using its sheer size and muscle to force countries into sub-
ordinate positions’ (The Guardian 2015). As an example of deepening security ties 
between the two, an Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) was signed 
in 2014 allowing US forces a rotational presence at locations in the Philippines (United 
States Embassy 2014). The Obama administration also pledged to increase maritime 
security assistance to the Philippines through the provision of two new naval vessels 
(Philstar 2015). President Aquino welcomed this greater role for the US in the region, 
stating ‘I think everybody would welcome a balance of power anywhere in the world’ 
(Dancel 2015). Vietnam’s relationship with the US also improved significantly at this 
time. The two implemented a Comprehensive Partnership in 2013, including 
a commitment of $32.5 million in maritime capacity building, and a Joint Vision 
Statement in 2015 resulting in a complete lift on the ban of lethal weapon sales to 
Vietnam. Whilst largely a symbolic gesture, Obama confirmed that this would allow 
Vietnam ‘access to the equipment it needs to defend itself’ in the region (White House 
2016). Vietnam also looked to strengthen ties beyond the US. It signed a Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership with India in 2016, and enhanced bilateral strategic cooperation 
with Japan, particularly in the area of defence engagement and maritime capacity 
building (Hiep 2017).
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These actions taken by the Philippines and Vietnam significantly undermine ZOPFAN. 
ASEAN’s limitations as a conflict resolution actor leave them little choice but to engage 
external powers in an effort to uphold sovereignty and maintain regional security. 
A number of ASEAN states disapproved of the Philippines’ decision to bring arbitration 
proceedings against China. These states were particularly disappointed that Manila 
‘neglected to undertake prior consultation within the grouping’ and believed that such 
an approach ‘undermined its efforts towards engaging China multilaterally in striving for 
a binding Code of Conduct’ (Tang 2016). ASEAN’s desire to impose regulations on state 
behaviour in the South China Sea through a legally binding code of conduct has been 
unsuccessful to date. A non-binding code based on the ‘ASEAN Way’ principles of restraint 
and dispute resolution without threat or use of force has been in place since 2002 (ASEAN 
2002). However, rather than engage China in a multilateral agreement based on ASEAN 
norms, the code has been frequently violated. With such divergent positions on the South 
China Sea, a more binding code has remained elusive. ASEAN has also failed to agree 
a common stance on the framing of the dispute. Both the Philippines and Vietnam 
requested that the 2016 ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting mention the Arbitral Tribunal 
ruling in its Joint Communiqué. This was blocked by Cambodia however, which claimed 
that the dispute should be dealt with on a bilateral basis (Mogato, Martina, and Blanchard 
2016). There was a similar outcome at the 2016 Laos Summit, which concluded without an 
official statement on the dispute. China’s ability to utilise its close relations with Cambodia 
and Laos to undermine ASEAN has further impeded the realisation of a ZOPFAN in the 
region.
President trump: competition and weakening multilateralism
The election of Donald Trump in 2016 enhanced ASEAN uncertainty at a time of sig-
nificant regional instability. The new president’s determination to abandon all policies put 
in place by his predecessor, coupled with his ‘America First’ policy agenda, raised doubts 
regarding the level of future US commitment towards the region. These doubts appeared 
realised when President Trump used his first week in office to remove the US from the 
TPP. US withdrawal was a blow to those ASEAN states that had joined the trade agree-
ment. Senator John McCain believed the withdrawal would send ‘a troubling signal of 
American disengagement in the Asia-Pacific region at a time we can least afford’ (South 
China Morning Post 2017). Withdrawal from the TPP was one of the first indicators of the 
Trump administration’s indifference towards regional multilateral initiatives. His decision 
to skip the East Asia Summit in November 2017, and the ASEAN summit and Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in November 2018, signalled to many in the region 
that ‘America has essentially abandoned its traditional presence in the Asia Pacific’ (Gallu 
2018). The Trump administration’s preference for bilateral deals with regional states has 
undermined ASEAN regionalism. As one regional commentator noted, ‘without an alto-
gether more wholehearted embrace of the Asia’s ASEAN-centred security multilateralism 
as well as deeper integration within the Asia-Pacific’s emerging community-style eco-
nomic order, the US will find itself relegated to the sidelines’ (Gupta 2018).
Under Donald Trump, the US failed to appoint an ambassador to the ASEAN secretariat. 
This was viewed as a ‘big insult’ to the group (Jaipragas 2020), further undermining 
regional trust. As Singaporean Ambassador Tommy Koh stated in 2018, ‘if Asia matters 
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to America, why is your leader, President Trump, not here?’ (Garekar 2018). This uncer-
tainty has provided an opening for a Chinese charm offensive in the region, causing 
ASEAN to become even more divided. The election of Rodrigo Duterte as Philippines’ 
president in 2016 proved an opportunity to weaken the US-led counter strategy in the 
South China Sea. Duterte stated his intention to abandon the Aquino government’s 
approach to competing maritime sovereignty claims with China. When the PCA ruled in 
favour of the Philippines in the South China Sea arbitration case, Duterte pledged to set 
aside the ruling in preference for ‘open alliances with China’ and in favour of ‘business, 
alliances of trade and commerce’ (Heydarian 2017, 1). China tempted Duterte with 
promises of $24 billion in trade and investment in 2016 alone (Heydarian 2017, 13).
Lack of a credible US commitment to the region has undermined the Trump admin-
istration’s attempt at a more assertive regional foreign policy that seeks to challenge 
China directly. The ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’ articulated in 2018 supports 
regional states ‘to protect their sovereignty from coercion by other countries’ and in the 
‘peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes’ (US Department of State 2018). 
The strategy also seeks to promote ‘fair and reciprocal trade’ (US Department of State 
2018), a concept that underpins Donald Trump’s protectionist ideals. Conversely, US trade 
competition with China has negatively impacted ASEAN by threatening regional supply 
chains whilst also contributing to the deterioration in US-China relations. ASEAN-China 
economic cooperation has grown significantly as a result, with ASEAN becoming China’s 
largest trade partner in 2020. In an attempt to push back against US protectionism, ASEAN 
has established a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) between ASEAN 
and five major trading partners (China, Japan, South Korea, India and Australia). First 
mooted in 2013 and finally established in November 2020, RCEP is the world’s largest free 
trade area. The partnership originally stalled due to tensions between traditional US allies 
and China, conflict between India and China, and potential-member state fear that the 
RCEP may become a vehicle for Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. As a result, RCEP 
became ‘a key test for ASEAN’s capacity to deliver on its often-cited centrality’ (DW News 
2019).
In the South China Sea, the US has increased the number of Freedom of Navigation 
Patrols (FONOPs) from two in 2015 to nine in 2019 (Larter 2020), in addition to sending 
armed drones and spy planes over the region’s waters. It has also stepped-up coop-
eration with Japan, Australia and India through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 
(Quad), a forum for informal strategic cooperation and dialogue. Despite initial dis-
cussion of a ‘Quad-plus’ to include ASEAN countries, the regional grouping has 
remained wary of being overshadowed by larger powers and drawn into an anti- 
China initiative (Saha 2018). Rather than support a ZOPFAN in the region, establish-
ment of the Quad has undermined ASEAN centrality, autonomy and a ‘regional solu-
tion to regional problems’, in addition to existing regional security forums such as the 
ARF. Nor is the Quad an example of ASEAN neutrality. ASEAN’s inability to uphold 
regional order coupled with uncertainty over US commitment has forced ASEAN 
member states to seek security guarantees from other regional powers. Vietnam and 
India have arranged a number of maritime defence engagements in addition to 
training of Vietnamese maritime personnel and funding for capacity building 
(Parameswaran 2019). A joint Australia-Vietnam statement in 2018 ‘underscored the 
importance of UNCLOS dispute settlement mechanisms and called upon the parties to 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 11
respect and implement the decisions’ of the PCA ruling (Dang 2019). Australian 
support for UNCLOS and the 2016 Arbitration ruling represents a shift away from 
a position of neutrality on the South China Sea to one closely aligned to the US and 
ASEAN claimant states (Thayer 2020). Vietnam has also conducted a number of 
maritime patrols with Japan, with the two expected to sign an advanced defence 
equipment deal in 2020 (Ryall 2020).
Conclusion
These recent events cast doubt over a ZOPFAN ever being achieved in Southeast Asia in 
the future. This is compounded by the long-term effects of the covid-19 pandemic on the 
region and the change in US leadership following the 2020 presidential election. The 
economic impact of covid-19 on ASEAN member states has been significant, with disrup-
tions to tourism, businesses and supply chains significantly slowing growth (ASEAN 
2020a). ASEAN’s initial response lacked unity and cohesion across the grouping. The 
pandemic stoked tensions between Vietnam and Cambodia, with the former unilaterally 
closing its borders to prevent spread of the virus. Despite a number of summits and the 
proposed establishment of a covid-19 response fund, regional commentators noted that 
a ‘unified response from ASEAN remains more in rhetoric than in reality, and in form rather 
than substance’ (Demetriadi 2020). There is also little hope in the region for a reduction in 
US-China tensions. Whilst an electoral win for Joe Biden in the 2020 US elections has 
restored some confidence in ASEAN through promises of a more engaged foreign policy 
strategy, there is less hope that the new president will bring a reduction in Great Power 
rivalry. Biden stated in 2020 that ‘the United States does need to get tough with China’, 
and that ‘the most effective way to meet that challenge is to build a united front of US 
allies and partners to confront China’s abusive behaviours’ (Biden 2020). This more 
engaged US foreign policy strategy poses significant obstacles to ASEAN’s quest for 
a ZOPFAN in Southeast Asia.
Examination of ZOPFAN from conception to present day raises deeper concerns 
over the degree to which ASEAN upholds the concept and whether a ZOPFAN in 
Southeast Asia has ever been truly achievable. As analysis has shown, ASEAN’s 
attempts to utilise the concept as a fallback position, whilst increasingly seeking 
security guarantees from external actors, is not sustainable. ASEAN is too easily 
divided by the Great Powers, and the region has become increasingly polarised. 
ASEAN’s ability to respond effectively to entrenched Great Power security competition 
whilst pursuing a ZOPFAN is therefore doubtful. Despite reiteration of the ZOPFAN 
principle, it is clear that the core concepts that underpin the declaration are weak and 
not adhered to in practice. ASEAN-centric security frameworks have proved unable to 
address heightened regional conflict, and this has paved the way for new security 
dialogues that side-line the Association. Increased involvement of regional powers in 
conflict resolution also undermines ASEAN regional autonomy and the ability of 
ASEAN to uphold regional order. Does this mean ASEAN is destined to remain power-
less in the face of renewed Great Power competition? Arguably, without a united 
approach underpinned by shared threat perceptions, strategic interests and 
a common purpose, the ability of ASEAN to agree a strategy vis-à-vis the Great 
Powers appears increasingly unlikely.
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